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Hon. John J. Gibbons
JOHN J. GIBBONSP2' I should say at the outset that I was assigned by
a United States district court judge to represent a pro se litigator who
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the New Jersey
statute. People in law enforcement like to refer to this statute as
Megan's Law,3"' but it is actually Chapter 133 of the Laws of 1994, the
Registration Act,323 and Chapter 128, the Notification Act.324 Those
statutes were proposed in the New Jersey legislature in October of 1994,
as the result of a public outcry325 over a terrible tragedy.326 Three
hundred thousand signatures were presented to the legislature on a
petition to do something about this kind of offense.327
The legislation consisted notjust of the two statutes I mentioned,
but also of eleven statutes dealing with such diverse subjects as changing
the sentencing of sex offenders 328 to the creation of a DNA data bank
329
321 Richard J. Hughes Professor of Constitutional Law, Seton Hall University
School of Law; Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1987-1990.
322 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-1 to 11 (West 1994) (providing a system of registration
which authorizes law enforcement officials to identify sex offenders and alert the public
when public safety requires).
323 Id. at §2C:7-2.
324 Id. at §2C:7-5.
325 See Joyce Price, States Find New Ways to Stop Sex Offenders, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1995, at A].
326 See Thomas Martello, Zimmer, Hoping Convention Will Boost Campaign, Cite's
Megan's Law, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug: 12, 1996.
327 See Michelle Ruess, A Mother's Plea: Pass Megan's Bill Panel Oks
Compromise, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Sept. 27, 1994, at Al [hereinafter A Mother's
Plea].
328 See, e.g., Michael Booth, Sex-OffenderBills Awaiting Signature, N.J.L.J., Oct.
24, 1994, at 8 (stating that the package of bills, commonly known as "Megan's Law"
includes a measure "allow[ing] for a prison term of 30 years to life if a person is convicted
of an aggravated sexual assault that involves violence upon a victim who is 16 years old or
younger").
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for the State of New Jersey and, as Ms. Grail mentioned, the lowering
of the standard for civil commitment?" The statutes were passed under
emergency suspension of the rules so as to eliminate any hearings in the
New Jersey Assembly, and to eliminate all but the briefest of hearings
in the New Jersey Senate.3 ' The only emergency, however, which led
to the suspension of the rules, was a statewide election on November
8th,33 in which the Speaker of the Assembly, Mr.- Haytaian, was a
candidate for United States Senate.333
Passion does not always lead to wise reflection, and the question
that has to be considered with respect to these statutes is not whether
3'9 See, e.g., id. (stating that "Megan's Law" also includes a provision "manda[ting]
that sex offenders provide a blood specimen for DNA analysis and establish a database for
the results..
330 See generally Sherman, supra note 10, at Al (stating that Megan's Law
"requires an end-of-sentencereview for every convicted sex offender and allows the attorney
general to apply for the civil commitment of those who have demonstrated a pattern of
compulsive behavior and pose a danger to others").
131 See, e.g., Michelle Ruess, Assembly OKs Megan's Law; Whitman Promises to
Sign Bill, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Oct. 21, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Assembly Oks
Megan's Law] (stating that when the Megan's Law legislation was introduced "Assembly
Speaker Chuck Haytaian ... declared an emergency and placed the bills on the floor for a
vote ... without holding the usual committee hearings").
"I See Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Incumbent Survives Grueling Race, THE RECORD
(New Jersey), Nov. 9, 1994, at Al. Democrat Frank Lautenberg defeated Republican
Assembly Speaker Chuck Haytaian in an election for the United States Senate. Id.
"' See, e.g., Michelle Ruess, Second Thoughts About Megan's Law; Concern
Growing Over Ripple Effects, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Feb. 19, 1996, at A l [hereinafter
Second Thoughts]. Assembly members did not hold a committee hearing concerning
Megan's Law because the Speaker of the Assembly, Chuck Haytaian, was running for the
United States Senate. Id.; see also Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law Moving Fast in Assembly;
Crackdown on Sex Offenders THE RECORD (New Jersey), Aug. 16, 1994, at A l [hereinafter
Moving Fasti (stating that Haytaian's justification for declaring the legislative emergency
that forced the Megan's Law proposals to move directly to the floor without the usual
committee debates was that it was in accordance with the wishes of the people of New
Jersey). But see Bill Sanderson, Glamour Politics Isn't the Name of the Game, THE RECORD
(New Jersey), Sept. 3, 1995, at 05 [hereinafter Glamour Politics] (noting the belief that
Haytaian pushed Megan's Law through the Assembly without the usual debates to guarantee
its passage before Election Day).
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deterring and punishing sex offenders is wise social policy.334 The
question is whether the Constitution permits this kind of legislation
reflected in the Registration and Notification Statutes.335
As Ms. Grail pointed out, the statutory classification, with
respect to notification, creates three tiers of offenders: a low risk of re-
offense, a medium risk of re-offense, and a high risk of re-offense. 3Y 6 As
initially enacted, the determination of that risk and, thus, of the level of
community notification, was left entirely up to the prosecutor with no
notice, no opportunity to be heard, and no judicial review.337
Originally, the Attorney General's position was that the scheme
presented no constitutional problem at all because nobody, prisoners or
non-prisoners, former offenders, or people with no record at all, had
331 See Second Thoughts, supra note 333. Commentators say that Megan's Law
was the product of "politics and passion," because at a New Jersey Senate Committee
meeting, "after a tearful testimonial from Megan Kanka's mother, the lawmakers ignored the
few witnesseswho raised questions." Id. Herb Honig, Councilman from Englewood, New
Jersey, said that Megan's Law "was a political solution .... [g]enerally, that is not the best
way to handle things." Id.
311 See Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d 1335, 1339 (N.J. 1995), affdas modified 662 A.2d
367 (N.J. 1995) (challenging the constitutionality of the two statutes claiming that they
violated several constitutionalprovisions, including protection from ex post facto laws, bill
of attainder, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, his right to privacy, due
process, and equal protection); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.
N.J. 1995) (challenging Megan's Law on ex post facto laws, bill of attainder, double
jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, right to privacy, due process, and equal protection
claims), affdin part, 81 F.3d 1235, reh'g denied 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Kathy
Barrett Carter, Judge Rules Megan's Law Constitutional but Temporarily Bars Warnings to
Public, STAR LEDGER(Newark), Feb. 23, 1995, at I. Judge Wells said that the registration
and notificationprovisions were not punishment in a constitutional sense and were enacted
to protect the public. Id.
336 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(c) (West 1995) (providing for determination of the
risk of re-offense by grouping the offenders into three categories).
33' Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 382. Although the Court upheld the law's
constitutionality,the Court concluded that any person determined to be a moderate or high
risk offender may request judicial review by a summary proceeding. Id.
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liberty or privacy interests that would be affected by the requirement of
registration and notification.33
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held otherwise.33 9 It held,
effectively, that the law was unconstitutional in that the offenders'
liberty or privacy interests are entitled to some level of procedural
protection?4' Thus, under the New Jersey "Judicial Surgery Doctrine,"
in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey regularly undertakes to re-
write legislation, the Court re-wrote the statute and built in a series of
procedural protections."'
Even as re-written by that eminent Court, however, the present
New Jersey scheme still violates federal standards of due process for the
protection of the acknowledged liberty and privacy interests that are
affected.342 I will come back to what those defects are in a moment.
But considering the upcoming election and the emotional
atmosphere in which these statutes were enacted,343 they are classic
338 See Bill Sanderson, State Shows Willingness to Modify Megan's Law, THE
RECORD (New Jersey), May 3, 1995, at Al. The New Jersey State Attorney General,
Deborah Poritz, stated that the "law is a form of regulation, not punishment." Id. Further,
Poritz stated that giving information about a sex offender's dangerousness does not violate
any constitutional privacy rights because such information is publicly available. ld; see
also Kathy Barrett Carter, Justices Hear Arguments on 'Megan,' STAR LEDGER, May 3, 1995,
at 1 (noting U.S Attorney Faith Hochberg's beliefs that when dealing with one's criminal
history, there is no constitutional right to privacy and that even if this right existed, the risks
the offenders pose to children outweigh any privacy right).
"' Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (holding, in part, that neitherthe registration
nor the notification statutes imposed punishment upon the offender and that they were
rationally related to the states interest in protecting the public from repeat sex offenders).
34 Id. at 381-82 (discussing the power of the court to amend statutes to remove
possible constitutional problems).
34 Id. at 381. The Court re-wrote the statute to limit notification under Tier Two
and Tier Three to organizations and people "likely to encounter" the offender. Id.
342 See C.P.M. v. D'llio, 916 F. Supp. 415,420 (1996) (discussingthe Doe v. Poritz
decision which stated that although the statute does not violate substantive due process
rights, the offender"[h]as an interest in privacy and reputation protected by procedural due
process afforded under both the federal and state constitutions").
143 See Glamour Politics, supra note 333 (discussing how many politicians are
using Megan's Law as a popular idea to help them win elections).
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examples of why the Founding Fathers included in the Constitution the
prohibitionsagainst bills of attainder,44 expostfacto laws,345 and double
jeopardy.346 These clauses reflect the need for the court to be a sober
second voice of the community; a voice that provides reflective, rather
than reactive, decision making.347 With respect to retroactivity, the
statutes violate all three clauses because they apply to people who have
been sentenced, who have completed their sentence, and who have not
been under supervision for years.348
344 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. The United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o ... ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id.
"I Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State
shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder (or) ex post facto Law." Id.
11" "No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." Id. at Amend. V.
141 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 438-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kranmick
ed. 1987).
It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts
were designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority . . . .Nor does this
conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
the judicial to the legislature power. It only
supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that
of the people, declared in the Constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather
than the former.
348 But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 423. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that Megan's Law does not violate the Ex Post Facto nor the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
United States Constitution, nor did it violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id. at 406; see
also Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1271 (1996) (holding that the
registration component of Megan's Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy
or the Bill of Attainder Clauses).
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Indeed, they apply to people who have been convicted of
offenses that are no longer crimes in the State of New Jersey.34 9
Alexander Artway, for example, the plaintiff in the case pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,35 was convicted of sodomy with
an adult female.35 He was acquitted of charges with respect to the use
of force.352 Sodomy with an adult is no longer a crime in the State of
New Jersey,353 but it is the Attorney General's position that Artway is
subject to the Registration and Notification Statutes.354 The statutes
apply to people who have been convicted of statutory rape,355 for
example, even though statutory rape is no longer a crime in the state of
New Jersey if the victim is over thirteen.356
The test for whether there is a violation of the three
constitutional clauses is well settled by the Supreme Court in three
349 Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235. The Court held that Artway was
still subject to Megan's Law notification policies despite Artway's assertion that it was not
clear whether his prior sodomy conviction qualified as a sexual assault crime since at the
time of his conviction, sodomy had been repealed by N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:98-2. Artway, 81
F.3d at 1269-70.
35
°Artway, 81 F.3d 1235. This case was decided on April 12, 1996. Id. "The court
vacated the judgment of the districtcourt insofar as it enjoined the enforcement of Tier Two
and Tier Three notification under Megan's Law, and affirmed that judgment insofar as it
holds the registration (including Tier One notification) of the law constitutional." Id. at
1235-36.
31' Artway v. Pallone, 672 F.2d 1168, 1170 (3d Cir. 1982).
352 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243 (reiteratingthat Artway was convicted for sodomy
and that the judge in that case found that Artway had used force in the commission of the
crime).
35 Sodomy has been reclassified as sexual assault. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 14-2
(West 1996). The definition of sexual assault does not encompass sodomy between
consenting adults. Id.
354 Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 667.
355 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(b)(l)(2) (West 1995 &'Supp. 1996) (including
statutory rape in the definition of sexual assault under N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 14-3(b) (West
1995 & Supp. 1996)).
356 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 14-2(a)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
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opinions, Halper in 1989,3"' Austin in 1993,35' and Kurth Ranch in
1994. 3" The test is whether the statute imposes punishment.36 ° What is
punishment presents a epistemological problem, but the Supreme Court
has given us the answer.3 6  The Court has held that a state imposes
punishment if it has any retributive or deterrent effect.362
The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in rejecting the
retroactive challenge to the statute that that is not the test, that the
regulatory purpose saves the statute from retroactive challenge.363
" United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447 (1989). The Court analyzed whether
a civil penalty could be considered punishment in the context of double jeopardy. Id. at 448.
The Court rejected the Government's argument that because the statute in question was
merely civil in nature, the Court was limited to an analysis of statutory construction to
determine the law's punitive nature. Id. at 441. The Court explained its cases have
acknowledged that for the defendant, even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.
Id. at 448.
358 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (stating that the central
inquiry in analyzing a forfeiture statute is not whether the statute is criminal or civil, but
whether it is punishment).
9 Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (asserting
that the state's Dangerous Drug Tax is not remedial, but purely retributive, and thus,
constitutes punishment).
" See, e.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied to the individual case serves
the goals of punishment. Id. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607 (noting the distinction between
remedial and retributive laws); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781 (asserting that state drug tax
constitutes punishment); Goodman, supra note 6, at 786 (pointing out that "in the Halper
line, the Court seems to focus exclusively on whether the sanction serves the dual aims of
statutory sanctions, namely retribution and deterrence").
361 Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
362 Id.
363 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). Here, the New Jersey Supreme
Court rebuffed the constitutional attacks on the registrationand notification provisions of the
statute. Id. at 423. The Court acknowledged that unless the law was made to apply
retroactively, it would not protect anyone until some time in the distant future. Id. at 373.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court upheld Megan's Law based on an interpretation
of the statute that strictly confines notification by tier classification in accordance with
legislative intent. Id. at 422.
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The whole criminal code has a regulatory purpose,"' and the
Supreme Court case law is clear: if the statute has any deterrent or
retributive purpose, it punishes, and if it punishes, it is unconstitutional
when retroactively applied.365
Do these statutes have a retributive or deterrent purpose? On
their face, they clearly do.366 First, they are triggered by past criminal
conduct and by nothing else.367 They are plainly retributive.368
Secondly, no risk factors other than past criminal conduct are dealt
with,3 69 although children are far more at risk of sex offenses by others
than recidivist stranger offenders. 7°
3' For example, the possession of dangerous weapons and the carrying of
concealed weapons are violations of a regulatory scheme defining how and where even law-
abiding citizens are permitted to carry weapons. Gregory W. O'Reilly, Truth-in-Sentencing:
Illinois Adds Yet Another Layer of "Reform" to its Complicated Code of Corrections, 27
LOy. U. CHt. L.J. 985, 1002 (1996).
365 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (stating that the purpose of the Ex
Post Facto Clause is "to protect person(s) from punishment by legislative acts having
retrospective operation"); Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10 (stating that a statute imposes
punishment where it serves either retributive or deterrent purposes).
' See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405 (recognizing that Megan's Law does have
a "deterrent punitive impact").
367 42 U.S.C.A. §14071(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996). The United States Code
requires "the Attorney General to establish guidelines for state programs that require a
person who is convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or who is
convicted of a sexually violent offense to register with a designated state law enforcement
agency." Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(a) (West 1994). The New Jersey statute requires
"a person who has been convicted, adjudicated or found not guilty by reason of insanity for
commission of a sex offense ... to register." Id.
" See Fred Cohen, Sex Offender Registration Laws; Constitutional and Policy
Issues, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 151, 153 (1995).
369 42 U.S.C.A. §14071(a)(1)(A)(West 1996);N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(a) (West
1994).
370 Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 807 n. 14 (1985) (stating that "of the 583
cases of child sex abuse examined in one survey, the offender was a family member in 47%
of the cases, otherwise an acquaintance of the child in 42%, and a stranger in only 8%").
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The statute involves specific deterrence.37' The registration
requirement, standing alone, reminds the offender that he is constantly
under police surveillance?72 He must give the police ten days notice of
his intention to move.373 He must report to the police every ninety
days.374 The statute also requires that when registering he must furnish
pictures, fingerprints, and genetic markers. 75  The registration
provisions and three-tiered notification scheme warn him that he is more
likely to be detected and identified if he re-offends.376 Plainly, this is
specific deterrence, which it is intended to be.377 Furthermore, the
statute involves general deterrence as well because potential sex
offenders are aware that if they are convicted, they are going to be
subjected to the registration and notification obligation forever.37
Deterrence is laudable?79 However, it covers a constitutional problem."'
371 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2 (West 1995 & Supp. .1996).
372 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265 (specifying that one of the purposes of registration
is to help law enforcement agencies to "keep tabs on these offenders").
373 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(d) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
"' Id. at §2C:7-2(e).
175 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264.
376 See generally id. (statingthat in passing Megan's Law, the legislature declared
the danger of repeat offenses by sex offenders requires a system of registration that permits
law enforcement officials to identify the offender easily and alert the public if necessary).
317 See id. at 1266 (generalizing that any incidental purpose to deter under the
registration requirement is constitutionally valid). But see id. at 1264 (interpreting the
legislative intent of New Jersey's Megan's Law as for the prevention of crime and the
protection of the public, not as being punitive in nature).
378 See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 4, at 796 (stating that registration places a sex
offender on notice that "subsequent sexual crimes" will be followed by investigation, thus
deterring future sex crimes).
379 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265 (noting that "the means chosen-registration and
law enforcement notification only-is not excessive in any way," the Court held registration
will help satisfy a "legitimate goal" of "allowing law enforcement to stay vigilant against
possible re-abuse"). Id.
38 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620. The Court noted that forfeiture laws argued by the
governmentto be remedial, not punitive, do not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. Civil
sanctions cannot be viewed only as remedial, but also as "serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, "and are therefore considered punishment." Id. at 621. But see Doe v.
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You cannot impose punishment twice; hence, if the statute has a
deterrent purpose, it is imposing punishment a second time."'
The statute, moreover, involves retribution.382 Notification will
result in isolation from normal social contacts.383 Historically,
punishment has been just that, the pillory, the scarlet letter, the
destruction of reputation? 4 To say that this notification is not what has
been historically recognized as punishment is nonsense. Notification
will affect a person's ability to find a job,"' meet a companion and
establish a stable relationship,86 and initiate membership in a church.387
Moreover, it will affect the ability to be let alone, the right Justice
Brandeis described as our most precious liberty.388 Notification will
Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388 (noting that although a statute "characterized as remedial" might
have some deterrent effect, it does not mean the law is punitive and therefore
unconstitutional).
38' Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1962) (stating that to
determine if a statute is punitive, one can use the test "applied to determine whether an Act
of Congress is penal or regulatory" and one factor included in this test is "whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence").
382 See Petrucelli, supra note 2, at 1161-62 (noting that notification laws will
ostracize sex offenders).
383 Id. at 1158 (stating that notification provisions have been referred to as "'scarlet
letter' laws, alleging that they brand the sex offenders forever").
384 See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689 (discussing the historical significance of being
branded by a community). Id. at 689 (finding that the public dissemination portion of
Megan's Law is a measure that has historically been punitive); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at
441 (Stein, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "identification, scorn and humiliation" which
result from notification are similar to punishments imposed during the time the United States
Constitution was adopted). But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 422 (holding that because the
legislation addresses a "pressing societal problem" which aims to safeguard the public
despite the possible detriment to past sex offenders, it "is not what those who drafted the
Constitution had in mind as an abuse of the government's power to punish").
385 Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688.
3- Cf id. at 689.
387 Cf id.
388 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[T]he right to be let alone- the most comprehensiveof rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.").
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result in vigilantism, harassment, and legal ostracism." 9 One of the
eleven statutes adopted at the same time is a statute providing for notice
to crime victims with respect to various stages in the criminal justice
system.39° Clearly, this statute was motivated significantly by a
retributive purpose.39'
With respect to its prospective application, Megan's Law was
enacted with no procedural safeguards whatsoever.92 Case law is clear,
however, that if there is either a federal substantive liberty interest or a
state substantive liberty or privacy interest, federal law determines what
level of procedural due process is required.393 In this instance, as re-
written by the New Jersey Supreme Court, there is now an opportunity
389 See Martone, supra note 8, at 39 (listing various vigilante acts carried out by
citizens in states that have sex offender notification statutes); Sheila A. Campbell, Battling
Sex Offenders: Is Megan's Law an Effective Means ofAchieving Public Safety?, 19 SETON
HALL. LEGIS. J. 519, 546-47 (1995). The author lists various vigilante acts committed by
citizens upon learning that a past sex-offender was living in their community. Id. The
accompanyingharassmentthat deters individuals from housing past sex-offenders inevitably
results in prolonged prison terms while officials attempt to find suitable living quarters for
them. Id. at 547.
3
"See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:4B-44 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996) (providing,
among other things, for notification to crime victims of any change in the status and
disposition of the case as it relates to dismissal, trial, sentencing and release of the criminal
for custody).
" But see N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-1 (West 1995) (declaringthat the purpose of the
statute is to "permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary
for the public safety" and "provide law enforcement with additional information critical to
preventingand promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons").
... See, e.g., Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (maintaining that the
"guaranties of due process . . . considered as procedural safeguards against executive
usurpation and tyranny have in this country 'become bulwarks also against arbitrary
legislation"'). In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or
liberty that is unconstitutional;it is the deprivationof property or liberty without due process
of law-without adequate procedures. Id. But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 421
(qualifyingthe decision to sustain the constitutionality of Megan's Law on the requirement
that there be an opportunity for judicial review of the prosecutor's decision to impose Tier
Two and Tier Three notification).
" Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982) (stating that the federal Due Process
Clause protects "state created liberty interests").
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for a hearing and for judicial review.394 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated that in the judicial review process the burden of
overcoming the classification decision is on the prospective registrant?95
In making the determination, the Attorney General's guidelines
set forth the registration and community notification laws bench
manual.396 The manual reads, among other things, that in applying the
criteria, this weighing process may take into account any information
available and encompass all credible evidence?97 Thus, a determination
of the number of victims or offenses may be based on documentation
other than a criminal conviction.398 Such documentation may include,
but is not limited to, criminal complaints not the subject of a conviction,
but which are supported by credible evidence; victims' statements;
admissions by the registrant; police, medical, psychological, psychiatric
and pre-sentencing reports; and Department of Corrections discharge
9 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 422-23.
9 Id. at 383. In implementing community notification procedures,
the State shall have the burden of going forward,
that burden satisfied by the presentation of the
evidence that prima facie justifies the proposed
level and manner of notification. Upon such proof,
the offender shall have the burden of persuasion on
both issues, that burden to remain with the
offender. In other words, the court... shall affirm
the prosecutor'sdetermination unless it is persuaded
by a preponderanceof the evidence that it does not
conform to the laws and Guidelines. Id.
396 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Jessica S. Oppenheim,
Prosecutor'sBureau, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of
Criminal Justice to all [N.J.] County Prosecutors, Guidelines for Law Enforcement for
Notification to Local Officials and/or the Community of the Entry of Sex Offender into the
Community 8-10 (Sept. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Memorandum], and its accompanying
addendum, Sex Offender Risk Assessment Scale Manual (Sept. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Risk
Assessment Scale Manual] (both on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights).
" Risk Assessment Scale Manual, supra note 396, at 5.
398 Id.
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summaries."' All this material is in the possession of the state, yet the
registrant has the burden of overcoming the state's classification
decision.400
Also taken into account are histories of anti-social acts,40 ' The
more extensive the anti-social history, the worse the prognosis for the
offender: °2 Anti-social acts include sex offenses or sexual deviancy not
the subject of criminal prosecution,4 3 as well as other crimes against
persons, crimes against property, and status offenses for juveniles.4 4
Acts that are not the subject of criminal charges, but that are credibly
represented in the records, may be considered.4 5 Such documentation
may include evidence of truancy, behavioral problems in schools, school
suspensions, or prior diagnoses of conduct disorders or of oppositional
defiant disorder.4 6, Acts perpetrated while incarceratedor committed are
399 Id.
Io In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1159 (N.J. July 31, 1996) (stating that after the
prosecutor has met its burden "the Registrant then has the burden of producing evidence
challenging the prosecutor's determinations on both [the proposed level of risk and the
manner of notification] issues").
4'' Risk AssessmentScale Manual, supra note 396, at 8 (stating that history of anti-
social acts is to be considered to evaluate the risk the sex offender poses).
402 In re C.A., 679 A.2d at 1158-59 (citing to the Registrant Risk Assessment
Manual which gives greater weight to historical factors related to anti-social behavior when
determining offender's future risk of re-offense).
" See Risk Assessment Scale Manual, supra note 396, at 8, and accompanying
text. "Anti-social acts include sex offenses or sexual deviancy not the subject of criminal
prosecution.... ." Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(4)(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996)
(stating that the number, date and nature of prior offenses are factors a prosecutor may
consider in determining an offender's tier classification).
404 Risk Assessment Scale Manual, supra note 396, at 8.
0 In re C.A., 679 A.2d at 1162. "Therefore, non-conviction offenses are to be
considered in evaluating a registrant'srisk of re-offense, provided there is sufficient evidence
that the offense occurred." Id.
'
6 Id. (discussinghow "sentencing authorities must attempt [to be] predictors of
an offender's future behavior ... by tak[ing] the defendant's 'whole life' into view...")
(quoting Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-OffenseSentencing, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 523, 553 (1993)).
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also included in determining what notification classification is to be
applied.4"7
The state has this panoply of hearsay that puts the burden on the
registrant to prove that he is not a compulsive repetitive offender.4"8
There is a form to fill out and also a lot of fancy language, but, in fact,
none of these categories have any scientific validity at all.40 9
Furthermore, I have heard some things stated today about the
recidivism rates of sex offenders, which the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, quoting from a government brief, included in its opinion.4"'
When one actually looks at the rates, it is clear that the recidivism rate
among sex offenders is no greater than, and in some states lesser than,
the recidivism rate among other offenders.41" '
407 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(7) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996) (stating that a
prosecutor must consider "recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under
supervision in the community as well as behavior in the community following service of
sentence" in determining an offender's tier classification).
4o8 W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D. N.J. 1996) (stating that an offender who
challengesthe tier classificationis similarto a plaintiff in a civil action who must overcome
the prosecution'scase "by a preponderanceof the evidence"); see also State v. Howard, 539
A.2d 1203, 1210 (N.J. 1988) (citingN.J. CODE OF CRIM. JUST., N.J.S.A. §2C: 1 -13d(i)). Id.
at 1210. "The general rule that a party whose interest or contention will be furthered if the
finding should be made.. ." has the burden of proof. Id.
9 See Scheingold, supra note 215, at 809. The diversity among sex offenders
casts doubts on the reliabilityof using empirical evidence to predict the likelihood of future
dangerous behavior. Id. at 814.
420 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374 (introducing statistics from briefs of the
Attorney General and the United States citing the Response Brief for the Attorney General).
Other studies showed a seven to thirty-five percent rate of recidivism for rapists; ten to
twenty-nine percent for molesters of young girls; thirteen to forty percent for molesters of
young boys. Id. at 375 (citing the Brief for the United States). Other studies showed that
sex offenders are more apt to re-offend than other types of offenders. Id.
4" See generally Scheingold, supra note 215, at 812 (citing GovERNOR's TASK
FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT, IV-4 (1989)). The Bureau of Justice
Statistics indicating rates of recidivism for released murderers, released rapists, all released
sex offenders and released robbers. Id. Rates of re-arrest for robbers were higher than any
other offenders. Id.
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This classification system of. attempting to predict future
individual human behavior is scientific nonsense. It is like the days
when we relied on phrenology, measuring the bumps on people's heads
to predict future criminal behavior.4"2
The application of this notification statute to people who have
been out in the community, having completely served their sentence,
will impose severe disabilities on them.4"3
Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court of the United States is
going to have to decide whether these statutes can pass constitutional
muster. In order to uphold them, the Court is going to have to overrule
three cases." 4
412 See generally United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1966)
(discussing how the scientific standards of phrenology and monomania are primitive).
413 Many released sex offenders who were subject to notification statutes were
harassed. See generally Popkin, supra note 117, at 65. Joseph Gallardo, after his release,
intended to move to Lynwood, Washington. Id. at 73. The community was notified of his
release and his plans to move into the neighborhood. Id. His house was burned down the
same day he planned to move in. Id. In another case, neighbors of a released sex offender
in Detroit stuffed tissues in his bathtub drain and flooded his apartment. Id.; see also Mark
Smith, Public vs. Private: Debate Rages Over Ex-Con's Rights, Community Safety, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 6, 1994, at 1. Raul Meza, a released sex offender, was harassed and forced
to move from six Texas cities. Id. Accordingto his family, he was persecuted by the media
and victims' rights groups. Id. His family said that he was set up to fail, and ultimately
ended up back in jail for violatinghis parole. Id; David Vanhom & Art Charlton, Megan's
Law Leads to Vigilante Attack, STAR LEDGER (Newark), Jan. II, 1995, at Al. A father and
son broke into the house of a newly released sex offender, Michael Groff, the first resident
of Warren County to have his name and address released to the public. Id. Unfortunately,
the father and son attacked the wrong man. Id.
414 See Artway; 876 F. Supp. 666 (holding, in part, that Tier Two and Three
notifications violated the Ex Post Facto Clause if enforced retroactively); State v. Babin,
637 So. 2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied 644 So. 2d 649 (La. 1994) (holding, in part,
that application of special probation provisions, specifically notification requirements that
were not in effect at the time he committed his crime, would unconstitutionally violate the
Ex Post Facto Clauses in the United States and Louisiana State Constitutions); Rowe v.
Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994) (concluding that plaintiffs had a
meritoriousclaim that the notificationprovision in the Alaska Registration Act was punitive
and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution).
